searches and seizures.2 To be more concrete, if, for example, the police were to utilize the BWR to determine whether John Doe -a man who neighbors say seems "strange" and doesn't "fit in" -feels sexually aroused when he is in the presence of women, the man could not complain of an invasion of any Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy.
On Kerr's analysis, while existing Fourth Amendment doctrine nominally protects normatively and empirically reasonable expectations of privacy, in practice, in almost all cases, the doctrine protects only property (in a broad and flexible sense, so that it includes rented spaces, for example) but not privacy. Because the BWR reads Doe's internal state without physically trespassing on his property, the regulation of its use -as a matter of most of the case law -should be left to Congress. As a normative matter, Kerr proposes that the Supreme Court defer to Congress in the area of handling the privacy implications of evolving technologies.
The Supreme Court and other judicial bodies, according to Kerr, would have a difficult time understanding the mechanics of how the BWR works or the context in which it might be used, whether by private people or by law enforcement.3 Moreover, the courts would be unlikely even to reach the issue of how the Fourth Amendment 2. Though Kerr acknowledges that cases such as United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705 (1984) , United States v. Knotts, 400 U. S. 276 (1983) , and Ky/lo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001), might limit the use of such technologies, Kerr, supra note 1, at 830, he deems them departures from the Court's usual approach and explains them as linked to property rights with which the information disclosed was ordinarily associated, though not to any extant property right with which the technology interferes. This characterization, however, has no explanatory power, because any time one invades privacy without actually interfering with property rights, it is possible to characterize the invasion of privacy at a level of generality that associates it with some traditional property right. For example, the BWR device could be described as an attack on property rights by noting that it exposes information that traditionally could be obtained only by seizing a person's journals. Kerr's phrase "property, broadly construed" thus gives us no information, except post hoc, about whether the Court might see fit to extend Fourth Amendment protection to it.
3. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 871-83. Kerr describes several examples of courts struggling to understand new technologies. Id. at 876. For example, in United States v. Bach, 2001 WL 1690055 (D. Minn. Dec 14, 2001 ), rev'd 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002 , the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court's finding that the Fourth Amendment required law enforcement presence at an Internet Service Provider's facility during a search for information on the ISP's servers. Kerr, supra note 1, at 876-77. Kerr asserts that "[t)he district court judge apparently assumed that the skills required to search a computer server are similar to the skills required to search physical property. " Id. at 877.
Similarly, in Trulock v. Freeh, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a girlfriend's consent to the search of a computer that she shared with her boyfriend did not allow law enforcement officials to search the boyfriend's password-protected files stored on that computer. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 879 (citing 275 F. 3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) ). Kerr criticizes the court's decision because it failed to discuss the technical details about password protection necessary to articulate exactly what the court found to be improper. Kerr, supra note 1, at 878-80. Kerr suggests "that the judges ... simply didn't understand enough about the technology of password-protection to know that their opinion left the rule unclear." Id. at 880.
applies to the BWR for many years after its appearance on the technological scene.4 Congress would therefore represent (and has historically represented) a better source of protection for our privacy from hi-tech government intrusion than the judiciary.
In one sense, the source of our privacy does not seem to matter very much. Most people would presumably want to be protected from the use of the BWR, particularly when the government lacks probable cause or some other articulable basis for suspecting the individual targeted. But if we were effectively protected from such intrusion, then the fact that it was Congress doing the protecting rather than the courts would probably not make much of a difference in people's lives.
Indeed, most Americans probably do not even know -when they think about particular privacy rights -whether those rights exist as a matter of statutory or constitutional law. 306, 343 (2003) , forecasting a twenty-five-year limit to the need for (and therefore, potentially, the constitutional validity of) affirmative action in public higher education.
13. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 465. O'Connor stated that: (I)n determining whether the State imposes an "undue burden," we must keep in mind that when we are concerned with extremely sensitive issues ... "the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature." ... This does not mean that ... we defer to the judgments made by state legislatures .... Rather, that when we face a complex problem with many hard questions and few easy answers we do well to pay careful attention to how the other branches of Government have addressed the same problem.
Id. (citations omitted).
14. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 828-30. Kerr asserts that after Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), this claim by attempting to demonstrate that a large number of the cases supposedly decided under the "reasonable expectation of privacy" framework are in truth more faithful to property law, broadly construed, than they are to privacy. There are a few reasons to question this claim, however, one of which is ultimately a matter of interpreting precedents.
First, in explaining its decisions, the Court refers repeatedly to "reasonable expectations of privacy" rather than to property, in the cases following Katz. These references may indeed reflect only some misguided need to profess fidelity to the Katz decision (or at least to Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in that case), while in fact pursuing the property-based reasoning that animated the law prior to Katz. Certainly, this explanation could provide an account of the failure of the Court's precedents to live up to the promise of Katz, a failure that is acknowledged by both supporters of and detractors from the privacy approach.15
On the other hand, it seems peculiar that the Court would pursue a property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment, one that it had previously embraced, and simultaneously pay lip service to a privacy based approach that may -as Kerr suggests 16 -not even be necessary to the Katz decision itself. If the Court were truly interested in applying the Fourth Amendment only to property it could easily have said so and thereby pursued its agenda openly.
As Kerr acknowledges, the Court does sometimes decide cases in a manner that seems to reflect its consideration of privacy rather than These cases suggest that courts generally do not engage in creative normative inquiries into privacy and technological change when applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies. For better or for worse, courts have tended to apply the same property-based principles to such cases that they have applied elsewhere.
Id. at 829.
15. Both supporters of and detractors from Katz have argued that the cases supposedly following Katz did not carry out the expected privacy revolution. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 1, at 818 n.99 (citing James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Priv,icy Province, 36 HASTINGS L. J. 645, 647 (1985) ; Jonathan Todd Laba, Comment, If You Can't Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Drug Business: Thermal Imaging, Emerging Technologies, and the Fourth Amendment, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1437 REV. , 1454 REV. (1996 ; and Richard S. Julie, Note, High-Tech Surveillance Tools and the Fourth Amendment: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Technological Age, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 131 (2000) ).
16. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 819-24. Kerr states that "for my purpose here, the trick is to note that Katz is correctly decided from the standpoint of [a] loose property-based approach." Id. at 820. Additionally, Kerr argues that attaching things to a person's property (here, the phone booth would be Katz's property for the duration of his telephone call, supported by his payment of the toll) is an invasion of property rights under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U. S. 419 (1982) , which said it was a taking to attach a cable box to a person's roof.
property concerns.17 As Kerr notes, though, some of the cases protecting (or finding no reasonable expectation of) privacy are also equally defensible on property grounds18 -but this should come as no surprise. There has long been significant overlap between property rights and reasonable expectations of privacy. Privacy is one of the things that people value about private property. We cherish the right to exclude others not only from using our privately owned (or rented) spaces, but also from occupying and observing us within our private spaces. For instance, to avoid being observed while engaged in private activities (or to be free of observation even when they have no particular private activity to pursue), people can enter their homes and shut the door. People can hide personal items in their houses or cars or hotel rooms and thereby prevent others from knowing of those items.
Protecting property, in other words, has in the past largely encompassed protecting privacy as well, and it is thus misleading to characterize the Fourth Amendment, textually or historically, as relevant to property but not to privacy. 27, 38-40 (2001) (finding that police use of an infrared thermal imager to identify hot spots on the outside surface of a suspect's home was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, and concluding that "[w]here ... the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant") United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 707-17 (1984) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation where police used an electronic tracking device to track a suspected drug conspirator's movement into several private homes, because use of the tracking device gave police access to information that would ordinarily have been concealed inside the privacy of people's homes)United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 279-85 (1983) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where police used an electronic device to track the location of a car owned by a suspected member of a drug conspiracy, because the information exposed was merely the car's location, which could have been obtained entirely through publicly available information, by following the car at a distance). The differing outcomes in Knotts, Karo, and Ky/lo, respectively, seem to turn not on any link to physical invasions of property (which both Knotts and Karo contain and which Ky/lo does not) but on the extent to which previously hidden and private matters are newly exposed through the use of the particular technology in question.
18. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 819-24. Kerr argues:
Katz is correctly decided from the standpoint of [a] loose property-based approach .... Charles Katz became entitled to Fourth Amendment protection in the public phone booth when he 'pa[id] the toll that permit [ted] him to place a call,' because at that point he became a legitimate user of the phone booth. In effect, Katz rented out the booth for the 'momentary' period of his call much like a hotel guest rents out a hotel room for the night. Like the hotel guest gaining Fourth Amendment rights in the hotel room during his stay, Katz acquired the owner's privacy rights in the phone booth during the period of his phone call.
Id at 820-21. (citations omitted). hypothetical brain-reader device all share in common the attribute of leaving traditional property rights untouched. No physical trespass need occur. But does that mean that the Fourth Amendmentdrafted and ratified in a simpler time, when the overlap between invasions of property and invasions of privacy was more completehas no bearing on these activities? To the extent that original understanding bears on constitutional law, it is sensible to attribute a concern about privacy to the founding generation and to the text of the Fourth Amendment itself.
In the late eighteenth century, someone who cared deeply about privacy could secure its effective protection by writing an amendment that guaranteed the people a robust right of security in their houses, papers, and effects. Such an amendment would automatically cover privacy interests as well. In a world where privacy and property were so intimately linked, it would have seemed unnecessary to craft a separate protection for privacy per se, particularly when the Fourth Amendment includes a right of security in one's "person" -an extension beyond contemporary notions of property that might have seemed adequate to cover any unusual invasions of privacy that failed to trespass upon real property or personal effects. The right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, in historical context, thus necessarily encompassed privacy. houses, persons, papers, and effects, would naturally be understood to recognize the value of privacy in all of its incarnations.
Of course, outside of new technologies, it remains the case that one can expect the greatest ability to enjoy privacy and exclude unwanted others in locations that one owns or rents. To the extent that a person does not own or exercise dominion over a place, enjoyment of privacy rights develops by custom and understanding (and law) rather than by a clearly designated and historically entrenched bundle of rights. 21. Id. at 34 ("We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search -at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use."(internal citations omitted)).
Id.
22. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 833 n.200.
The difficulty is that under Ky/lo the frequency of light determines whether it receives Fourth Amendment protection. Light in the visible spectrum does not receive Fourth Amendment protection: looking at an object using human eyes is not search. However, light in the infrared spectrum is protected by the Fourth Amendment, at least when the object emitting the infrared light is a home. From the standpoint of physics, this is something like saying that the government needs a search warrant to look at blue objects but not red objects.
Rather than show fidelity to traditional property rights, however, as Kerr claims, the Kyllo decision represents a refusal to ignore the privacy that once received automatic protection from existing property law but now (due to technological innovation) may be violated without touching existing property entitlements.
23. See Katz, 389 U. S. at 351-54.
decline of such spaces with the rise of mobile phones); and the chemical composition of one's urine.24
In the past, because privacy tended to correspond most closely with the ability to exclude others physically, it followed that privacy rights would closely track (although not mirror entirely) property rights. (2001) (finding that, absent consent, a hospital had violated the Fourth Amendment rights of several of its female patients who had sought obstetrical care, by performing drug tests on those patients in a manner aimed at providing evidence to the police; the Court held that such drug testing constituted a search triggering the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards). But see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding a public school program that subjected student athletes to random drug tests, where the test results would be maintained confidentially, separate from the student's other records, and released only to school personnel on a "need to know" basis). See also Colb, supra note 6, at 1709 (criticizing as counterintuitive the holding and reasoning in Smayda v. United States 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965). Colb observes:
In Smayda, the petitioners were convicted of engaging in oral copulation with each other through a hole carved between two stalls within a restroom in Yosemite National Park, in violation of California law. Police [had] .. . arranged for a hole to be cut in the ceiling over each stall, "for purposes of observation. " [Many were observed using the restroom stall for various purposes even though [t]he police ... lacked individualized suspicion prior to any individual bathroom viewing. The Court of Appeals held that there was still no Fourth Amendment violation, reasoning that "when people resort to such a public toilet for criminal purposes, they deliberately take the chance that they may be observed by police officers, and that they are not protected from such observation" -a waiver argument. The court added that, alternatively, no search had occurred, because "these stalls were, in essence, a public place. " (citations omitted).
25. Kerr, supra note 1, at 815-25.
wearing wires and recording devices to form relationships with private people, without probable cause, a warrant, or any level of suspicion.26
Because such practices obviously invade privacy, Kerr argues, it follows that the Court has not truly been interested in protecting privacy that does not happen to intersect with property rights.
I interpret these and other cases differently. First, the use of deception to enter a private home strikes me as directly implicating interests in property as well as privacy, because both are part and parcel of the right to exclude people from one's house. Using deception to do what would otherwise constitute trespass, then, is no more respectful of property rights than using deception to acquire visual and aural access to private areas and conversations is respectful of privacy rights. With respect to both property and privacy, the Court demonstrates an assumption of risk approach -if you trust people, you do so at your own peril -that fails to keep faith with either a property or privacy conception of Fourth Amendment rights.
As I argued in a recent article,27 this approach (of equating risk of exposure with actual exposure) is inappropriate, because the government has an obligation to act in a normatively appropriate way and thereby to expose people to no greater intrusion than would exist in the world of purely private interactions. In other words, rather than "the Court has deviated from a strict focus on how the technology works and instead created rules to preserve the degree of surveillance 26. See Colb, supra note 24, at 139-40 (characterizing "pretend friend" cases). Colb characterizes "pretend friend" cases as those in which the government:
Id.
[B]ehaves like an intimate who betrays a friend's trust ... . In reviewing challenges to various undercover operations, the Court has held that nothing in the Fourth Amendment prevents a government agent from feigning a relationship with a person and thereby insinuating himself into the person's confidence .... [T] he Court recognizes no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's friends." (citations omitted).
27. See id. Though I take issue with the Court's notion that everyone can already follow a car's whereabouts in public (in the way that a tracking device permits ),36 it is clear that the Court's analysis, however flawed, rests on a conception of privacy from public observation that exists independently of property rights (one of which property rights, as Kerr notes,37 ordinarily includes an interest in not having things affixed to 32. Kerr, supra note 1, at 830.
34. Id. at 831.
Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
36. See Colb, supra note 24, at 132-37. I criticized Knotts "because people do not expect to be followed when they move about in public areas," see id. at 134, and further faulted the Knotts/Karo distinction as failing to correspond to people's actual concerns about privacy from exposure. Id at 134-37.
37. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 821 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV 458 U. S. 419, 435-38 (1982) , in which the Court found an installation similar to the tape recorder involved in Katz to be a direct taking of property, which required just compensation to the owner. In Loretto, an apartment building owner protested the state-sanctioned installation on her building of cable television boxes and associated wires. The Court characterized the placement of the boxes as a "permanent physical occupation" of the owner's property. Kerr argues that the same logic applies to Katz. In particular, Kerr suggests that in Katz, the government installed the device on a property that Katz had rented (i.e., the phone booth), and used information obtained through that invasion of Katz's property to procure damaging evidence against him).
one's property, as the tracking device must be in both Knotts, where the Court did not find a violation, and Karo, where it did). Ky/lo is yet another instance in which the usual freedom from public observation that one enjoys inside one's home generates a privacy-regarding ruling regulating the use of heat detection technology to discern goings-on within the house even absent an invasion of a property right. Though Kerr finds the analysis anomalous (mocking, for example, the distinction between visible and invisible light waves ),38 it is entirely in keeping with a Fourth Amendment approach that regards as sacred the individual's right to keep out public observation of her home, i.e., the "privacy" dimension of private property.
In yet another case that implicates privacy but not property, the The relationship between the two branches can therefore be complimentary rather than conflicting, and in any event, there is no principle that bars Congress from continuing to protect privacy in the beneficial ways that it has done in the past. As the Court's recent decision upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act's application to states demonstrates, there is a crucial doctrinal difference between a federal statute that extends further protection to an interest the Court's doctrine already recognizes as special (such as the interest in avoiding sex discrimination), and a federal statute that purports to "enforce" constitutional rights that the Court says don't exist in the first place. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 735-36 (2003) (distinguishing cases in which the Court forbade Congress's extension of constitutional protection against discrimination that, under the Court's precedents, would only trigger low-level scrutiny). In other words, Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment to "enforce" existing constitutional rights against the states is far broader than its power to protect rights that the Court has said are not found in the Constitution.
45. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 854-855 (stating, for example, that "Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act to protect the privacy of bank records" and that "Congress's handiwork in the field of Internet surveillance law offers a promising framework" (citations omitted)).
protecting privacy, then litigants will have recourse to legislative and constitutional arguments when they appear in court. But the availability of one kind of protection does not and should not preclude the availability of the other. To refuse to enter into the thicket of Fourth Amendment rights against new technologies, in other words, would be an abdication of the courts' responsibilities.
The real normative and empirical questions, then, are, respectively, whether the Fourth Amendment ought to be read, and whether it has been read, to protect privacy in addition to and independent of any link to property. Kerr answers the latter question in the negative: doctrinally, he argues, the post-Katz cases can best be explained as applications of a Fourth Amendment right of property, broadly construed. As I have already explained, this reading of the precedents is strained. The normative question, however, does not necessarily turn on this answer. If, in fact, it is a mistake to apply the Fourth Amendment to privacy, then any doctrinal suggestion to the contrary ought to be rejected for the future, and what better place to do it than a context in which property is no longer at issue?
So we face the normative question: Is it a mistake to protect privacy? Professor William Stuntz has put forward that suggestion.46 If Stuntz is right that privacy is not valuable, then it makes perfect sense to reject the application of Fourth Amendment law to technology, where only privacy but not property is at issue. But I think Stuntz is wrong,47 and perhaps more importantly for present purposes, so does Kerr. Kerr clearly does value privacy; he praises rather than laments congressional vigilance in stepping into the void to protect privacy from technological invasion. He apparently views privacy as an important value, but one located primarily outside of the Fourth Amendment.
As I have argued, Kerr's analysis does not support his conclusion.
Fourth Amendment doctrine does not purport to protect privacy merely when it is tied to property, but actually, and appropriately (if imperfectly), protects privacy, even from governmental invasions accomplished through new technology when property rights are not directly implicated. Kerr may be correct that Congress is as good as or better than the courts at protecting privacy, but absent some reason to think that the courts will systematically overprotect privacy, the fact that we can generally rely upon the democratic process is no reason to forego the additional protection for individual rights that the judiciary affords for those occasions when majority rule threatens to become majority tyranny. 47. See Colb, supra note 6, passim.
